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Case Notes

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-COMMERCE CLAUSE-A Use Tax
Levied Against the Storage and Withdrawal of Aviation Fuel Imported from Outside the Taxing State for Use Solely as a Source
of Motive Power for Interstate Air Carrier Operations is Not
Violative of the Commerce Clause. United Air Lines, Inc. v. Mahin,
410 U.S. 623 (1973).
Illinois applied its general revenue use tax to the aviation fuel
of appellant airline purchased in Indiana and shipped into Illinois
where it was stored temporarily before being loaded onto aircraft
for consumption in interstate and foreign flights. United Air Lines
claimed that this application of the tax contravened the commerce
clause of the United States Constitution. The Illinois Supreme
Court rejected the carrier's claim and upheld the tax.' Held, Vacated
and Remanded: The United States Supreme Court ruled that since
storage or withdrawal from storage were appropriate taxable
events occurring within Illinois, the tax did not place an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce.' United Air Lines, Inc.
v. Mahin, 410 U.S. 623 (1973).
Use taxes' are imposed on the privilege of using items of tangible
personal property within the state imposing the tax. This method
of taxation is designed to complement state and local sales taxes
that can be avoided to an extent by interstate commercial transactions. For example, a higher sales tax rate in one state can be
'Two members of the Illinois Supreme Court, however, expressed the view
that an alternative taxing method sought by United which would subject only
fuel actually consumed over Illinois to taxation would offend the commerce
clause. United Air Lines, Inc. v. Mahin, 49 Ill.App.2d 45, 50, 273 N.E.2d 585,

587 (1972). The two justices based their conclusion on the rationale of Helson
v. Kentucky, 279 U.S. 245 (1929).
'The United States Supreme Court reasoned that the facts in Mahin did not
warrant the application of the Helson doctrine. Noting that "a method of tax

measurement intimately related to interstate commerce is not automatically unconstitutional," 410 U.S. 623, 632, the Court remanded to avoid any risk of
affirming a decision that might have been decided differently had not Helson
been misunderstood. See Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437,
443 (1952). The Illinois Supreme Court reaffirmed and acknowledged its error
in a per curiam opinion, Ill.App.2d -,
N.E.2d (1973).

' Use taxes are also referred to as excise or privilege taxes.
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avoided by purchasing items elsewhere for delivery and use within
the state imposing the higher sales tax.' The imposition of a tax
on use eliminates the possible tax advantage of making purchases
in another state and serves the two-fold purpose of protecting local
business from loss of sales and protecting state governments from
loss of revenue."
Illinois enacted its use tax in 1953, taxing the "exercise of any
right or power incident to the ownership of tangible personal property." A temporary storage provision, however, exempted from
the tax tangible personal property acquired outside Illinois and
which, subsequent to being brought into the state and stored there
temporarily, was used solely outside Illinois. The Illinois Tax Commission, in applying the tax to aviation fuel imported into Illinois
for use in interstate flights by air carriers, originally concluded
that the temporary storage provision exempted from taxation fuel
that was not actually burned over Illinois. In 1963, however, the
Tax Commission reinterpreted the application of the tax and determined that temporary storage ended and taxable use began when
fuel was taken from storage tanks and loaded into an aircraft.
Since it made all fuel loaded aboard its planes taxable, United Air
Lines challenged this interpretation of Illinois' use tax.
The Supreme Court in upholding the Tax Commission's revised
interpretation of the Illinois tax in Mahin, relied primarily on two
cases decided some forty years earlier in which use taxes were also
challenged: Nashville, C. and St. L. Ry. v. Wallace6 and Edelman
v. Boeing Air Transport, Inc." In Nashville, a railroad imported
gasoline into Tennessee to be stored temporarily before being used
solely as a source of motive power in interstate commerce. The
Court sustained the state tax on the privilege of storing the gasoline
or its withdrawal for sale or use. Taxation of a right or power
incident to ownership of the gasoline, e.g., storage or withdrawal
from storage, the Court reasoned, was taxation of an event separate
' See Warren & Schlesinger, Sales and Use Taxes: Interstate Commerce Pays
Its Way, 38 COLUM. L. REV. 49, 55 (1938). See, e.g., In re National Cash Register

Co. v. Taylor, 276 N.Y. 208, 11 N.E.2d 881 (App. Div. 1937), cert. denied, 303
U.S. 656 (1938).
5P. HARTMAN, STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE 137 (1953).
6288 U.S. 249 (1933).
7289 U.S. 249 (1933).

1974]

CASE NOTES

and apart from the flow of interstate commerce 8 which did not
impose an unconstitutional burden on that commerce.9 The Edelman case involved a tax like that discussed in Nashville, but concerned an air carrier. Wyoming imposed a use tax on gasoline
brought in from outside the state for use on interstate flights. The
Court in Edelman held that since the taxable event was storage or
withdrawal from storage, "the burden of the tax was too indirect
and remote from the function of interstate commerce to transgress
constitutional limitations."'"
The Supreme Court in Mahin distinguished the use taxes upheld
in Edelman and Nashville from a use tax struck down in Helson
v. Kentucky." In Helson, a Kentucky statute which levied a tax
on all gasoline used within the state was applied to fuel consumed
by a ferry boat engaged in exclusively interstate commerce between
Illinois and Kentucky. Although seventy-five per cent of the ferry's
gasoline was consumed on waters in Kentucky the tax was struck
down. The Court noted that the taxpayer maintained no business
facilities in Kentucky and that the gasoline was purchased and
loaded aboard in Illinois. The only activity taking place within
Kentucky was consumption of fuel. Taxation of the mere consumption of gasoline by a state, the Court felt, was a direct burden on
interstate commerce amounting to a price exacted for the privilege
of using an instrumentality of interstate commerce.' The Mahin
decision reaffirmed the vitality of Nashville, Edelman and Helson
by noting that the "line drawn between an impermissible tax on
mere consumption and a permissible tax on storage of fuel before
ISee

p. 117 and note 37 infra.
9 288 U.S. at 268.
1o289 U.S. at 252. The Court is citing, with approval, language from Nash-

ville, 288 U.S. at 268.
" 279 U.S. 245 (1929).
""A tax, which falls directly upon the use of one of the means by which
commerce is carried on, directly burdens that commerce. If a tax cannot be laid
by a state upon the interstate transportation of the subjects of commerce, as this
Court definitely has held, it is little more than repetition to say that such a tax
cannot be laid upon the use of a medium by which such transportation is effected."
Id. at 252. See also Bingaman v. Golden Eagle Western Lines, 297 U.S. 626
(1936).
The privilege of carrying on exclusively interstate commerce is a federal privilege that may not be burdened by state taxation. Spector Motor Service v. O'Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951); Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U.S. 47 (1891); McCulloch
v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
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loading continues to serve rational purposes."" In Nashville and
Edelman, an ascertainable taxable event occured within the taxing
states; in Helson, no event, save consumption, occurred within
Kentucky.
The reasons why the Supreme Court has chosen to draw the line
where it has are outgrowths of the attempt by the Court to implement the original purpose of the commerce clause without ignoring
the vast economic and technological changes that have taken place
in the nation subsequent to the adoption of the Constitution. The
commerce clause provides that Congress shall have power to regulate commerce among the several states. The purpose of the clause
was to insure the development of an open national economy free
from trade barriers and protectionist measures like those various
states had seen fit to enact during the period of Confederation. '
The free flow of commerce, then, was declared to be of paramount
national interest and was not to be impeded by the exercise of
state authority. State power, even over purely intrastate activities,
may be pre-empted under the commerce clause if the exercise of
that power has a detrimental effect on interstate commerce."
That the taxing power is among those state powers limited by
the commerce clause would seem to be clear, since the power to
tax may readily be used to erect barriers restricting interstate
economic activity. The precise extent of the clause's limitation on
state taxing power, however, is not clear. This is due to the fact
that the commerce clause does not go beyond enabling Congress
to regulate interstate commerce. The extent to which the clause
is a self-executing ban on the exercise of state taxing power can
only be implied by the judiciary based upon its notions concerning
the requisites of an open economy. Early decisions of the Supreme
Court indicated that interstate commerce was immune from most
forms of state taxation. "Interstate commerce cannot be taxed at
all," declared the Court, "even though the same amount of tax
11410
4

U.S. at 629.
' T. CALVERT, THE REGULATION OF COMMERCE UNDER THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 3-5 (1907). The open-market purpose of the commerce clause has
been enunciated by the framers of the Constitution and by the Court. See THE
FEDERALIST Nos. 7, 11, 22 (A. Hamilton), No. 42 (J. Madison); Memphis Steam
Laundry Cleaner, Inc. v. Stone, 342 U.S. 389, 395 (1952); Gibbons v. Ogden,

22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
5

See Chicago, M., St. P. & Pac. R.R. v. Illinois, 355 U.S. 300, 306 (1958);
The Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U.S. 342 (1914).
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should be laid on domestic commerce, or that which is carried on
solely within the state."" The Court originally took this position
because the power to regulate interstate commerce was considered
to rest exclusively within the domain of Congress." State taxation
of interstate commerce was often therefore considered an intrusion
upon congressional authority."
Two developments, however, have contributed substantially to a
relaxation of the original limitations placed on state taxing power
when the interstate commerce was involved. First, the economic
growth of the nation has been marked by the development of business and industry from primarily local enterprises into multi-state
and national entities." Secondly, local government has shown a
growing need for funds. State governments have required more and
more revenue to provide social services, roads, public assistance,
educational facilities and other benefits for which there has been
an increasing demand."' Interstate commerce has undoubtedly been
among the recipients of these benefits and services provided by the
states. Consequently, the Supreme Court has determined that the
states be allowed to require that interstate commerce share in the
tax burden2' and that the judiciary must therefore "guard against
imprisoning the taxing powers of the states within formulas that
are not compelled by the Constitution."' Pursuant to this rationale,
the Supreme Court has allowed state and local governments to
utilize many varieties of taxes, including the use tax, to secure
revenue from interstate commerce.'
"Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing Dist., 120 U.S. 489, 497 (1887). See also
Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U.S. 640 (1888); Case of the State Freight Tax,
82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 232 (1872). Not every sort of state tax that might conceivably affect interstate commerce was banned. For example, the states were allowed
to collect property taxes on artciles within their jurisdiction after the goods had become part of the "common mass" of property within the state. Precisely when
goods become part of this common mass is not always clear. Compare Champlain Realty Co. v. Brattleboro, 260 U.S. 366 (1922) with Bacon v. Illinois, 227
U.S. 504 (1913).
"Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827).
"See P. HARTMAN, supra note 5 at 22-33.
"1J. HELLERSTEIN, STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION 162 (3d ed. 1969).
20 Id.
"1Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska State Bd. of Equalization & Assessment,
347 U.S. 590 (1954); Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250
(1938).
'Wisconsin vs. J. C. Penny Co., 311 U.S. 435, 445 (1940).
23 See Developments in the Law-Limitations on State Taxation of Interstate
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Even though the states enjoy extensive taxing authority over

interstate air carriers, the commerce clause is still a limiting factor
on this power. It is probable that a use tax will be struck down as

violative of the commerce clause if it is: (i) discriminatory against
interstate commerce, (ii) considered excessive or (iii) imposed on
the privilege of using an instrumentality of interstate commerce. 4
A state law providing for the application of a tax to the storage or
withdrawal of fuel when interstate use is contemplated while intrastate commerce remains free of the same or a comparable tax is
patently discriminatory and invalid.' Moreover, even though a
taxing statute is fair on its face, if it is discriminatory in opera-

tion it will be declared invalid. 8
In addition to being non-discriminatory, a use tax must not
exceed in amount a fair compensation to the state. 7 If the reviewing court considers the amount of the tax to be unreasonable in
relation to the benefits conferred by the state on the carrier, then
Business, 75 HARV. L. REV. 953, 956 (1962). The Court has acknowledged that

the rule of Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing Dist. has been "narrowly limited."
McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33, 57 (1940).
7,It should be noted at this point that the principles governing the validity
of state and local taxation of air carriers engaged in interstate commerce are
basically the same as the rules applicable to other carriers. See Annot., 31 L.
Ed.2d 975, 977 (1973).

1 Cf. Best & Co. v. Maxwell, 311 U.S. 454 (1940); People ex rel. Schoon v.
Carpenter, 2 Ill.2d 468, 118 N.E.2d 315 (1954) (use tax applied when vehicles
purchased outside the state where none was applied when purchased within the
state declared invalid). But see Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Georgia Public
Serv. Comm'n, 295 U.S. 285 (1935).
A use tax statute that does not allow a credit for sales or other taxes previously paid in another state would seem to be patently discriminatory against interstate commerce. The Supreme Court, however, has indicated that this allowance is not necessarily a constitutional requirement (see Henneford v. Silas Mason
Co., 300 U.S. 577 (1937)) and has in fact sustained use tax statutes containing
no credit provision for taxes paid in other states. See S. Pac. Co. v. Gallagher,
306 U.S. 167 (1939) (no credit feature); Gregg Dyeing Co. v. Query, 286 U.S.
472 (1932) and Ry. Express Agency, Inc. v. Virginia, 282 U.S. 440 (1931) (credit allowed only for local sales tax payments). None of the taxpayers in these
cases, however, made a showing that the same property had been taxed in two
different states. Presently, every state imposing sales and use taxes, except Arkansas and West Virginia, allow credit against the use tax for sales taxes paid on
the same property in another state. CCH STATE TAX GUIDE, ALL STATES UNIT
6013 (2d ed. 1967).
26See Nippert v. City of Richmond, 327 U.S. 416 (1946).
2 A state may require revenue from interstate commerce only "in relation to
opportunities which it has given, to protection which it has afforded, to benefits
which it has conferred.
Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444
(1940).
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the tax must fail even though the same or similar tax is imposed
on intrastate commerce." Air carriers operating in several states
may not be taxed in excess of a reasonably apportioned share reflecting the use occuring within the state. 9 The cost of state-provided services and facilities and the extent of their actual use by
the carrier may therefore be important factors in determining the
fairness of a tax. The Supreme Court has invalidated taxing schemes
wholly unrelated to use" but has generally seen fit to sustain taxing
measures, even fees or percentage rates8' unrelated to actual use,
as long as these measures are not proven by the carrier to be excessive.' Proof of excessiveness involves more than a showing that
the tax lacks absolute fairness. The carrier must prove that the
amount of the tax does not even approach a "rough approximation" of the value of benefits provided by the state.3
Finally, a use tax offends the commerce clause if it is imposed
on the privilege of using an instrumentality of interstate commerce,
e.g., the consumption of fuel. This is the principle of the Helson

case which was reaffirmed in Mahin. This prohibition, when
coupled with the long-established rule that articles actually moving
in interstate commerce may not be taxed," may create the imv. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249 (1946).
See Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska State Bd. of Equalization, 347 U.S.
590 (1954).
30 See McCarroll v. Dixie Greyhound Lines, Inc., 309 U.S. 176 (1940) (tax
based on amount of gasoline over twenty gallons carried in tanks when entering
state); Interstate Transit, Inc. v. Lindsey, 283 U.S. 183 (1931) (tax based on
seating capacity).
"' See Evansville-Vanderburg Airport Authority Dist. v. Delta Airlines, Inc.,
405 U.S. 707 (1972) (one dollar charge on emplaning passengers); Capitol Greyhound Lines v. Brice, 339 U.S. 542 (1950) (highway toll based on two per cent of
the fair market value of the vehicle).
a The burden of proof is on the carrier to show that the tax is excessive. See
Evansville-Vanderburg Airport Authority Dist. v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 405 U.S.
707, 719-20 (1972); Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306 U.S. 583, 598-600 (1939);
Ingles v. Morf, 300 U.S. 290 (1937).
88 International Harvestor Co. v. Evatt, 329 U.S. 416, 422-23 (1947). In other
words, "the use taxpayer has the burden of showing that he is subjected to a
substantially greater tax burden than the taxpayer who buys locally." P. HARTMAN, supra note 5 at 170 (emphasis added). This proof is difficult. (Id. at
170-71) especially since the Court has not made clear what kind of evidence
must be presented to show that a tax is excessive. See Annot., 17 A.L.R.2d 421,
432 (1951).
Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co. v. Calvert, 347 U.S. 157 (1954); Hughes
Brothers Timber Co. v. Minnesota, 272 U.S. 469 (1926); Case of the State
Freight Tax, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 232 (1872).
28Freeman
29
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pression that use taxes involving the fuel of interstate carriers are
difficult to justify since the fuel is either moving or being consumed

in interstate commerce almost continuously. That this is not the
case is evidenced by the Supreme Court decisions in Eastern Air
Transport, Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Comm.," Nashville, Edelman, and several other cases " that followed Helson and validated
use taxes when the fuel of interstate carriers was involved. The
relative ease with which the constitutional prohibitions noted above
can be avoided is due to the narrow view that the Supreme Court
has taken regarding what constitutes movement or consumption
in interstate commerce. Taxation of some "local event" severable
from actual interstate movement or consumption, the Court feels,
is a tax only indirectly burdening interstate commerce and is permissible." The Court has been willing to go to great lengths to
find a local event or "taxable moment" after interstate movement
has ended and before an article has begun to be used or consumed
in interstate commerce on which to sustain use taxes." This policy
-285 U.S. 147 (1932).
"' See American Airways, Inc. v. Wallace, 57 F.2d 887 (6th Cir. 1932), afl'd
per curiam, 287 U.S. 565 (1932) and American Airways, Inc. v. Grosjean, 3 F.
Supp. 995 (D.C. La. 1933), aff'd per curiam, 290 U.S. 596 (1933).
87The direct-indirect burdens distinction is a test that has been frequently
used by the Court to distinguish between permissible and impermissible state
taxes affecting interstate commerce. See P. HARTMAN, supra note 5 at 28-33. This
test necessarily places a great deal of emphasis upon the incidence of a tax, i.e.
when and where tax liability arises. Severability of the taxed event from movement or consumption in interstate commerce will generally lead the Court to
characterize the event as "local" and the tax burden as "indirect." Some events
or activities that might be considered local in nature, however, may not be taxed
if they are deemed to be integral parts of interstate commerce. See Puget Sound
Stevedoring v. Tax Comm., 302 U.S. 90 (1937) (tax on unloading or discharge
of cargoes of vessels); Joseph v. Carter & Weeks Stevedoring Co., 330 U.S. 442
(1946) (tax on loading and unloading). The Court in Mahin was careful to note
that the Illinois use tax fell upon storage or withdrawal from storage of fuel
before it was loaded into the tanks of an aircraft. 410 U.S. at 629, 631.
8 See S. Pac. Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. 167 (1939); where a California tax
on use and storage was applied to railroad equipment purchased and imported
from outside the state and used in maintaining interstate railway lines. Some of
the equipment was installed immediately upon arrival within California, the movement being "as nearly continuous as managerial efficiency can contrive." Id. at
177. Nevertheless, the tax was sustained. See also the companion case of Pacific
Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. 182 (1939). Cf. Utah Power & Light Co.
v. Pfost, 286 U.S. 165 (1932) (tax on production of electricity sustained when
production and transmission in interstate commerce were virtually instantaneous).
More modern cases sustaining use taxes as applied to air carriers are: Flying
Tiger Line, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 157 Cal.App.2d 85, 320 P.2d 552
(1958) (aircraft); American Airlines, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 216
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provides a fair result, the Court believes, since the state taxing the
local event is likely to provide benefits related to the event taxed.
In Mahin, for example, the Court suggested that benefits provided
by the state included police protection and access roads to storage
facilities.' Moreover, taxation of an ascertainable local event apart
from consumption is felt to minimize the danger of cumulative
tax burdens on interstate commerce, i.e. the danger that the same
activity will be taxed in another state."'
The result in Mahin is not surprising since it is consistent with
the earlier rationale of Edelman and Nashville. Nor is the result
disturbing in the sense that anyone can point to a clear inequity
having befallen the taxpayer in this particular case. What is disturbing, from the carrier's viewpoint, is that the Mahin decision
evidences a continuing reluctance on the part of the Supreme Court
to interfere with state taxing measures."' In light of this reluctance
and the continuing revenue needs of state and local government,
carriers can expect to be subjected to more and higher state taxes
as new taxing measures are enacted and exemptions are narrowed
or eliminated. '
Any relief that may be afforded must come from Congress.
There are indications that Congress is not entirely satisfied with the
Cal.App.2d 180, 30 Cal. Rptr. 590 (1963) (aircraft parts). Cases involving state
taxation of air carriers are collected in Annot., 31 L. Ed.2d 975 (1973).
410 U.S. at 630.
4' The multiple burdens doctrine was originally applied in Western Live Stock
v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250 (1938). This doctrine emphasized apportionment of the tax in relation to the taxpayer's nexus with the taxing state. The incidence of a tax was considered to be of little importance. Conceivably, the tax
invalidated in Helson might have been sustained under the multiple burdens test
had it provided for proper apportionment. Compare Justice Rutledge's opinion
in McLead v. J. C. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327, 358 (1944) (dissenting) with his
opinion in Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Stone, 335 U.S. 80, 96-98 (1948) (concurring). While the multiple burdens doctrine was rejected by a majority of the
Court in favor of the old "direct-indirect burdens test" in Freeman v. Hewit, 329
U.S. 249 (1946), the language of "multiple burdens" has appeared in a number
of decisions since Freeman, including Mahin. For an examination of the Court's
commerce clause tests, see P. HARTMAN, supra note 5 at 21-48; J. HELLERSTEIN,
supra note 19 at 163-70.
"1Cellar, The Development of a Congressional Program Dealing with State
Taxation of Interstate Commerce, 36 FORDHAM L. REV. 385, 386 (1968).
'See Brabson, Determining Whether Exemptions Apply is Still Dificult;
Courts Unsure, 7 J. TAx. 204 (1957). The author predicts determined efforts to
eliminate tax exemptions in states where sales and use taxes are an important
source of revenue.
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Court's handling of commerce clause issues. ' In the area of air
commerce specifically, Congress has recently enacted a law banning head taxes on emplaning passengers4 even though the Supreme Court found that this type of tax did not offend the commerce clause.' While not referring specifically to the use tax
area, several members of the Supreme Court itself have indicated
that Congress may be more capable of balancing the national
interest in an open economy with the revenue needs of the states. '
In a dissenting opinion involving a state income tax on revenues
derived from interstate commerce, Justice Frankfurter observed:
At best this court can only act negatively; it can determine whether
a specific tax is imposed in violation of the Commerce Clause. Such
decisions must necessarily depend on the application of rough and
ready legal concepts. We cannot make a detailed inquiry into the
incidence of diverse economic burdens in order to determine the
extent to which such burdens conflict with the necessities of national economic life. Neither can we devise appropriate standards
for dividing up national revenue on the basis of more or less abstract principles of constitutional law, which cannot be responsive
to the subtleties of the interrelated economics of Nation and State."7
The concerns expressed by Justice Frankfurter are also applicable to state use taxes on interstate carriers. Since the cost factor
primarily determines whether a tax is or is not unduly burdensome,
" Cellar, supra note 41.
"Act of June 18, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-44 § 7, 87 Stat. 96, amending Title

XI, Federal Aviation Act of 1958, adding § 1113 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 1113(c)
(Supp. 1974)). Congress has also compiled an exhaustive study concerning state
taxation of interstate commerce, including constitutional questions. See SPECIAL
SUBCOMM. ON STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE, H.R. REP. No. 1480,
88th Cong., 2d Sess., vols., 1 and 2 (1964); H.R. REP. No. 565, 89th Cong., 1st
Sess., vol. 3 (1965) (sales and use taxes); H.R. REP. No. 952, 89th Cong., 1st
Sess., vol. 4 (1965).
' Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Authority Dist. v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 405
U.S. 707 (1972).
" Mr. Justice Douglas dissenting in McCarroll v. Dixie Greyhound Lines,
Inc., 309 U.S. 176 (1940); Mr. Justice Black in McCarroll (dissenting opinion);
Gwin, White and Prince v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 434, 448-55 (1939) (dissenting
opinion); J. D. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307, 327 (1938) (dissenting
opinion); Mr. Justice Clark in Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v.
Minnesota, 358 Northwestern Airlines v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292, 300 (1944)
dissenting in Northwestern States and McCarroll; Mr. Justice Jackson concurring
in Northwest Airlines; Mr. Justice Rutledge in McLeod v. J. E. Dilworth Co.,
322 U.S. 327, 360 (1944)

"Northwestern
476-77 (1959).

(dissenting opinion).

States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450,
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a meaningful dollars and cents consideration of the costs incurred
by both the state and the carrier in relation to the tax is important.
A court, however, may not be capable of this measurement nor
may it be inclined to devote more time and effort than is absolutely
necessary to the consideration of issues that are primarily economic
in nature. While the Supreme Court certainly has not ignored the
economic consequences of questioned use taxes, it has been willing to approve taxes amounting to a rough approximation of the
value of state-provided benefits.' Even if this overly simplistic
analysis is acceptable in an individual case, it fails to appreciate
the fact that interstate air carriers are subjected to numerous state
use taxes, each of which may "overcharge" the carrier, but which
may not, in the eyes of the Court be considered excessive. Additionally, other factors like the cost of complying with the numerous
and varied state taxing requirements are given little, if any consideration. These objections, of course, do not affect the carrier's
ability to contend that a use tax is either patently discriminatory
or that it falls too directly on the privilege of using an instrumentality of interstate commerce. It is unlikely, however, that a legislature would enact a law that could be considered patently discriminatory against interstate commerce, and, as the Mahin decision indicates, the ban against taxation of the privilege of using
an instrumentality in interstate commerce may be avoided without
difficulty. The carrier therefore should recognize the limitations of
the courts as a forum for challenging the constitutionality of questioned state taxes under the commerce clause.
The formulation of a congressional policy regarding state taxation of air carriers is in order. This policy should insure a degree
of uniformity in the state taxation of air carriers or perhaps establish an administrative board competent to determine the full economic impact of a tax. As matters now stand, it is largely up to the
states to determine how much an air carrrier can be required to
contribute through various taxing schemes. Unless Congress chooses
to act, it is unlikely that the comence clause will be a substantial
factor in limiting the exercise of state taxing powers."
Stephen N. Wakefield
See note 33 supra.
I In Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota, 322 U.S. 292 (1944), it was suggested to Congress by the Court that it might be desirable to develop uniform
48

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

PRIMARY JURISDICTION-ANTITRUST EXEMPTION-The
CAB Has Primary Jurisdiction for Alleged Violations of Antitrust
Laws by Air Carriers Even Though the Board Has Not Approved
the Conduct at Issue and Can Not Grant Damages in the Action.
Laveson v. Trans World Airlines, 471 F.2d 76 (3d Cir. 1972).

In 1967, Defendants, twelve airlines, sought the approval of the
Civil Aeronautics Board of an agreement providing for a two
dollar fee to be charged coach passengers for visual, inflight entertainment.' The Board indicated that the charge was reasonable, but
gave no affirmative ruling on the application Defendants subsequently implemented the agreement. Plaintiffs, as class representatives of all coach passengers who had paid the two dollar fee,
brought an antitrust action for treble damages in federal court

alleging that defendants had conspired in violation of the Sherman
Antitrust Act in agreeing to and implementing the charge. Approval by the Board, under section 414 of the Federal Aviation
Act,3 of an agreement like that of defendant-air carriers relieves
the parties from the operation of the antitrust laws to the extent of
the approval given. The plaintiffs alleged that the lack of Board
approval prior to implementation of the agreement left the conduct
of defendants exposed to the operation of the antitrust laws without recourse to subsequent action by the Board; the statutory inability of the Board to grant damages, the only remedy sought by
plaintiffs, vitiated the requirement of prior resort to the federal
agency. The district court, however, granted defendant's motion
to dismiss on the grounds that the action was subject to the primary
standards for state taxation of air commerce. Shortly thereafter, the Civil Aeronautics Board was directed by Congress to study and report on the problems of
state taxation of air carriers. See H.R. Doc. No. 141, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945).
The resulting CAB report prompted the introduction of several bills in Congress
providing for uniform apportionment formulas for use by the states in taxing
airlines. See H.R. 1241, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947); S. 2453, 80th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1948); S. 420, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949). None were ever enacted.
' The Federal Aviation Act requires that air carriers file with the CAB for
approval every agreement between carriers relating to the establishment of transportation rates. 49 U.S.C. § 1382 (1970).
1In CAB Order No. E-24839 (March 9, 1967), 32 Fed. Reg. 4086, 4087, the
Board deferred action on the agreement, stating that though a charge of two dollars would be reasonable, the implementation of the charge could be better accomplished through the rule making powers.
349 U.S.C. S 1384 (1970).
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jurisdiction of the Civil Aeronautics Board. Held, affirmed:' Neither
the failure of defendants to obtain approval of the agreement prior

to its implementation, nor the statutory inability of the CAB to
grant damages in reparation for past conduct wrested primary jurisdiction from the CAB. Laveson v. Trans World Airlines, 471 F.2d
76 (3d Cir. 1972).
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction provides that in cases originally brought in a court, in which both the court and the agency
have subject matter jurisdiction, the court should not exercise its
jurisdiction until certain issues have been passed upon by the appropriate administrative agency.' At its inception, the rationale for
applying primary jurisdiction was dependent on the concept of
the agency as a fact finder.' The idea was that the court should stay
its action until issues of fact requiring the expertise of administrative specialists have been determined by the agency.! Though expertise and the concept of the agency as a fact finder persist in current notions of the doctrine,8 another consideration, uniformity,
4 The court vacated and remanded on the ground that the district court should
not have dismissed but rather should have stayed pending approval or disapproval
of the agreement by the CAB. Only in this way could problems with the statute
of limitations be averted in the event of CAB disapproval and a subsequent reinstitution by plaintiff of proceedings under the damage provisions of the antitrust laws.
5See generally K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT 344; Jaffe, Primary
Jurisdiction, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1037 (1964).
8 The early cases involved the conflict between common law jurisdiction of
courts and the statutory jurisdiction of the newly created Interstate Commerce
Commission. Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Abiline Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426
(1907); Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Merchants Elevator Co., 259 U.S. 285 (1922).
The reasoning which emerged was that the determining factor would be "the
character of the controverted question and the nature of inquiry necessary for
its solution." Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Merchants Elevator Co., 259 U.S. 285,
291 (1922). Questions primarily of fact or involving matters with which the
agency has expertise, such as reasonableness of rates, were to be considered by
the agency. See, e.g., Armour and Co. v. Alton R.R., 312 U.S. 195 (1941); St.
Louis, Brownsville & Mexico Ry. v. Brownsville Navigation Dist., 304 U.S. 295
(1938); Board of R.R. Commrs. v. Great Northern Ry., 281 U.S. 412 (1930).
"Pure" questions of law were to be decided by the court. See, e.g., Brown & Sons
Lumber Co. v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 299 U.S. 393 (1937); Great Northern
Ry. Co. v. Merchants Elevator Co., 259 U.S. 285 (1922).
For a severe criticism of the concept of "expertise" as grounds for agency
jurisdiction see Schwartz, Legal Restriction of Competition in the Regulated Industries: An Abdication of Judicial Responsibility, 67 HARV. L. REV. 436 (1954).
See also Jones, The Anomaly of the Civil Aeronautics Board in American Government, 20 J. Am L. & COM. 140 (1953).
8See Far East Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570, 574 (1951); Breen
Air Freight, Ltd. v. Air Cargo, Inc., 470 F.2d 767, 774 (1972), cert. denied, 411
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has become increasingly important as the scope of agency regulation has been enlarged The function of uniformity in the application of primary jurisdiction is not merely to insure that issues of
fact are determined consistently, by one body, but also to solidify
the legal standards made applicable to particular kinds of conduct
when agency standards under an administrative statute differ from
those ordinarily applied by the courts.
In recent years the most prominent and controversial application
of primary jurisdiction has occurred in cases like Laveson v. Trans
World Airlines which involve the enforcement of the federal antitrust laws against members of the so-called regulated industries."
The courts have accepted the premise that the Sherman and Clay-

ton Antitrust Acts represent a fundamental national economic
policy in favor of competition." This policy is not, however, clearly
defined in relation to several industries that Congress has singled
out for special regulation. With respect to the air transportation
industry, Congress has indicated through legislation that the public
interest is best served by substantial limitations on competition.
As in other industries, Congress has delineated in an administrative
statute standards of competition for the industry differing from
U.S. 932 (1973). In Far East the Court stated "in cases raising issues of fact not
within the conventional experience of judges or cases requiring the exercise of
administrative discretion, agencies created by Congress for regulating the subject
matter should not be passed over." 342 U.S. 570, 574 (1951).
'The Court in Far East also stated "[U]niformity and consistency in the regulation of business entrusted to a particular agency are secured . . . by preliminary
resort." 342 U.S. 570, 574-75 (1952). One writer concluded that the "formulation" of the rationale for primary jurisdiction stated in Far East was "preferable
to some others because it subordinates administrative specializations to uniformity and consistency." K. DAvis, 3 ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE 54 (1958).
"See, e.g., American Airlines, Inc. v. North American Airlines, Inc., 351
U.S. 79, 82 (1956) where the Court pointed out that "unfair practices and methods of competition" as defined by the Federal Aviation Act contain a broader
concept than the common law idea of unfair competition. See generally Petrucelli
and Long, Antitrust and the Regulated Industries: The Role of the Doctrine of
Primary Jurisdiction, 1 TOLEDO L. REv. 303 (1969). The writers refer to the
issue of divergent legal standards as "statutory duality."
" Jaffe, Primary Jurisdiction,77 HARV. L. REV. 1037, 1060 (1964).
12Compare
Carnation v. Pacific Westbound Conference, 383 U.S. 213, 218
(1966), with F.C.C. v. R.C.A. Communications, 346 U.S. 86 (1953).
13 See, e.g., the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 301 (1970); the Shipping Act of 1916, regionally enacted as Act of Sept. 7, 1916 ch. 451, 5 1, 39
Stat. 728 (1916), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 801 (1970); Civil Aeronautics Act of
1938, 52 Stat. 1018, as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 642 (Supp. 1952).
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those of the Sherman and Clayton Acts,' and has created an
agency with pervasive regulatory powers to enforce these standards
of competition in accordance with the public interest.15 One of the
most common regulatory powers granted for this purpose is the
ability to exempt industry conduct from the operation of the national antitrust laws. Section 414 of the Federal Aviation Act
establishes the power of the CAB in this respect." An air carrier,
which has sought and received the approval of its conduct from
the CAB, is immunized from the operation of the antitrust laws
by the administrative statute to the extent of the approval given.'
Problems arise, however, when a carrier engages in unapproved
conduct that is violative of the federal antitrust laws, as did defendants in Laveson, and is correspondingly sued in federal court.
Both court and agency have technical statutory jurisdiction in this
situation; the question is whether the court may retain jurisdiction
and grant the remedy warranted under the antitrust laws or
whether it must yield to the primary jurisdiction of the agency
and allow the administrative standards of competition to control
the conduct at issue. The situation is further complicated in cases
like Laveson in which the plaintiff seeks only damages, a remedy
the CAB is powerless to give. 8
The decision of the Third Circuit in Laveson to uphold the primary jurisdiction of the CAB was founded upon the rationale of
14The Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1302 (1970) states:
In the exercise and performance of its powers and duties under this

chapter, the Board shall consider the following, among other things,
as being in the public interest. . . . (c) the promotion of adequate
. . . service without . . . destructive competitive practices.

The Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, the forerunner of the Federal Aviation Act
and unchanged by it with respect to the "competition" provisions recited above,
was designed to eliminate the "public menace" of "unbridled and unregulated
competition." 83 CONG. REC. 6507 (1938). See also S.S.W., Inc. v. Air Transp.

Ass'n of Am., 191 F.2d 658, 661 (D.C. Cir. 1951) where the court stated:
mhe aircraft industry, . . . is one in which Congress has decided
that the public interest is best served, not by free competition, but

rather by direct and uniform regulation by an 'agency authorized
to supervise almost every phase of the regulated company's business.'
s49 U.S.C. § 1381 (1970) gives the Board the power on its own initiative

to investigate and determine whether any air carrier has engaged in unfair methods of competition, and to order any carrier to cease and desist from such practices.
1049 U.S.C. § 1384 (1970).
7

See Hughes Tool Co. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 409 U.S. 363 (1973).

18The

Federal Aviation Act contains no provisions for the award of damages

by the CAB.
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uniformity."9 In holding that lack of prior Board approval of the
conduct complained of was not proper grounds for avoiding primary jurisdiction, the circuit court reasoned that the uniform application of the Board's regulatory policy could be undercut if the
doctrine were not applied." The Board is unilaterally empowered to
investigate conduct within its jurisdiction and to immunize or enjoin that conduct when appropriate under administrative standards.2" The retention of jurisdiction by a court and an award of
relief pursuant to the antitrust laws creates the possibility of conflicting rulings by the court and the agency on the legality of the
same prospective conduct.'
For support of its reasoning, the court in Laveson relied principally on three decisions: United States Navigation Co. v. Cunard
S.S. Lines,' S.S.W. v. Air Transport Ltd.,"4 and Pan American
World Airways v. United States. ' Each of these cases involved an
antitrust suit for injunctive relief in which the court ruled in favor
of agency jurisdiction notwithstanding the failure of defendants to
gain the approval of the agency prior to implementation of the
conduct complained of. The Supreme Court grounded its opinion
in Cunard upon a broad reading of the "comprehensive" administrative statute involved in that case, the Shipping Act.' Not only
does the Shipping Act establish industry wide standards of competition, but section 15 of the Act, like section 414 of the Federal
Aviation Act, provides for the immunization of agency approved
conduct from the operation of the national antitrust laws."7 The
Court reasoned that it could not have been the intent of Congress
to carve out an area of law for a specific agency to interpret uni19 Although the court did allude to the traditional concept of expertise in
agency discretion. 471 F.2d 76 (3d Cir. 1972).

20 The

court stated:
[b]ecause of the possibility that in exercizing the power over the
subject matter of this controversy, the Board may approve the agreement here alleged to violate the antitrust laws we hold that prior
resort by plaintiffs to the CAB is required. 471 F.2d 76, 81 (3d Cir.

1972).
2149 U.S.C. § 1381 (1970).
2471 F.2d 76 (3d Cir. 1972).
23284 U.S. 474 (1932).

- 191 F.2d 658, 661 (D.C. Cir. 1951).

2 371 U.S. 296 (1963).
29284 U.S. 474, 480, 485 (1932).
2746 U.S.C. § 814 (1970).
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formly only to "strip it of primary original jurisdiction ...because
of a failure of [defendants] to file." 8
The decisions in Pan American and S.S.W. applied the same
concept of uniformity to cases involving the jurisdiction of the
CAB. The Court in Pan American reasoned that if the courts were
to "intrude" on the jurisdiction of the Board with their construction
of the antitrust laws, "the two regimes might collide." 9 Similarly,
the decision in S.S.W. expressed concern over the possibility of
courts enjoining conduct as violative of the antitrust laws even
though the agency specifically authorized to deal with the conduct
has determined or may decide that "such practices serve the national air transportation policy."'"
The application of this concept by the court in Laveson to an
action for damages only goes to the heart of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. Because the CAB is without the statutory power
to assess damages in reparation for past conduct, the question
arises whether a determination of the legality of past conduct by
the court could conflict with subsequent action by the Board.'
Indeed, the court in Laveson referred to several cases in which the
inability of the Board to award damages was the cornerstone of a
decision upholding the retention of jurisdiction by the court when
the antirust laws were involved." An example of this reasoning is
the decision of the Second Circuit in Allied Air Freight, Inc. v.
Pan American World Airways, Inc." In that case, since plaintiffs
were bankrupt, there was no possibility of injunctive relief in the
actions. Because adjudication of past conduct by the court in the
action for damages would have no effect on the future conduct of
the parties, the Second Circuit reasoned that court determination
without prior resort to the CAB would not impinge on the "agency's
ability to promote a uniform scheme" of regulation by approval or
U.S. at 485.
2"371 U.S. at 310.
2"284

"191 F.2d at 663.
"Because the award of damages by the court would operate as an adjudication
of past conduct only, it is arguable that such award could not conflict with any
decision of the Board with regard to the prospective behavior of defendants.
"1471 F.2d at 82. The court referred to Allied Air Freight v. Pan American
World Airways, 393 F.2d 441 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 846 (1968),
and Aloha Airlines, Inc. v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 349 F. Supp. 1064 (D. Hawaii
1972).
"3471 F.2d at 82.
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disapproval of prospective behavior." The court in Laveson distinguished Allied and cases following it on the ground that they involved conduct that was no longer continuing or otherwise "not
a problem" at the time the antitrust suit was filed.' The Third Circuit concluded in cases like Laveson, in which the conduct of defendant is still in effect and has a continuing effect upon the plaintiff, a judicial determination of issues would undercut the Board's
ability to regulate.
In defending this conclusion, however, the court in Laveson was
still faced with the decision of the Supreme Court in Carnation Co.
v. Pacific Westbound Conference,' another case involving the primary jurisdiction of the Federal Maritime Commission under the
Shipping Act. In Carnation,the Court concluded that the principles
established in Cunard' preclude courts from awarding treble damages without prior resort to the agency only when the defendants'
conduct has already been arguably approved by the Maritime
Commission." No exception was made in Carnation for cases in
which defendants' conduct, though not arguably approved, is continuing at the time the antitrust suit is filed. The heart of the reasoning in Carnationwas that the agency has "no power to validate
pre-approval implementation of agreements."3 Thus, even if the
conduct of the defendant was continuing and still a problem, a
deferral to the agency and a subsequent approval could not serve to
immunize that conduct occuring prior to approval. This result, the
Court concluded, avoided the possibility of direct conflict between
court and agency.
The court in Laveson distinguished the decision of the Supreme
34393 F.2d 441 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 846 (1968).

471 F.2d at 82, quoting Allied Air Freight, Inc. v. Pan American World
Airways, Inc., 393 F.2d 441, 445 (2d Cir. 1968).
36383 U.S. 213 (1966).
" The Court in Carnation defined the principles established in Cunard in

terms of conflict avoidance. "The ...Cunard principles [require] the courts [to]
refrain from taking action which might interfere with the Commissions exercise
of its lawful powers." 383 U.S. at 221.
38
1d. at 222.
3'Id. at 222. The Court looked to the specific language of the Shipping Act,
49 U.S.C. § 814 (1970). It determined that because only those activities which

were lawful under the Shipping Act were exempt from the antitrust laws and because an activity was lawful under the Act only "when and as long as approved
by the Shipping Board," all agreements not yet approved by the Board were not

lawful and thus not exempt.
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Court in Carnation on the ground that there is a vital difference
between the Shipping Act involved in Carnation and the Federal
Aviation Act:
Unlike the Federal Aviation Act.... the Shipping Act provided
antitrust immunity for approved agreements but expressly withheld
immunity from agreements not yet approved.' (emphasis added)
The Third Circuit refused to rule expressly on the power of the
CAB to retroactively immunize unapproved conduct; however, its
opinion expressly invites that determination by the Board and implicitly grants the power pending future action.' The decision
establishes the rule that so long as the conduct complained of is
still in effect and still is a current problem, the court must defer to
the primary jurisdiction of the CAB. '
A recent decision of The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, Breen
Air Freight Ltd. v. Air Cargo Inc., failed to recognize the validity
of the distinction between section 15 of the Shipping Act and section 414 of the Federal Aviation Act." In Breen the court refused
to require primary resort to the CAB in an antitrust action for
damages only involving an agreement that was still in effect when
the action was brought. Rather, the Second Circuit adopted the
reasoning of the Supreme Court in Carnation and determined that
unless the conduct complained of has been arguably approved by
the CAB prior to implementation, the district court need not defer
to the Board "irrespective of whether the activities are continuing
activities or completed activities.""
A proper application of the concept of uniformity would undermine the decision of the Second Circuit in Breen and extend the
holding of the Third Circuit in Laveson. That the concept was in40471 F.2d at 83. See note 36 supra.
41Id. at 83 n.7. The court points out that judicial determination of the Board's
power would more appropriately be made after it has acted but concludes that
until the Board has ruled on the matter the defendants' conduct will be presumed
to be of "debatable legality" and thus subject to the primary jurisdiction of the
CAB.
"4Ifthe Board approves the conduct complained of, the defendant is exempt
from the operation of the antitrust laws. The determinations of the Board are of
course subject to substantial evidence review on appeal in the courts. See 49
U.S.C. § 1486 (1970).
43470 F.2d 767 (2d Cir. 1972). The resolution of the primary jurisdiction
issue was the alternative holding in the case.
44d.
at 773.
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tended by Congress not merely to embody a policy of avoiding
conflict between court and agency with respect to the same prospective conduct of a defendant, but more broadly to require the
application of administrative competitive standards as the primary
measure of conduct in the industry was strongly indicated by the
Supreme Court in Pan American World Airways v. United States.'
The majority in Pan American pointed out that "the type of competitive regime which . . . [the Act] visualizes . . . has its special
standards of the public interest as defined by Congress.""' Whether
or not transactions involving "questions basic to the regulatory
scheme ... meet the standards of competition and monopoly provided by the Act is peculiarly a question for the Board." 7
The extent to which the Board may assert the standards of
the Federal Aviation Act as the primary competitive standard
in the air transportation industry is defined by its ability to
sanction the behavior of the industry in conformity with the
Act's provisions.' Though the CAB is unable to impose negative
sanctions for past conduct in that it is unable to award damages
directly, the power to retroactively immunize past conduct would
allow the Board the equivalent power. If primary jurisdiction is
applied to all antitrust actions, including those for damages only,
in which the dominant facts alleged are encompassed by the Act,
the approval or disapproval of the Board determines whether or
not the conduct of the defendant is protected from or exposed to
the treble damage provisions of the general antitrust laws on the
reinstitution of the action in federal court. The conduct of the
industry will be conformed to the standards by which postimplementation exemptions may be obtained, i.e. those of the Federal Aviation Act, notwithstanding that the conduct is violative of
the antitrust laws.
If, on the other hand, as in Breen, the district courts are allowed
to retain jurisdiction over antitrust actions for damages merely
because the defendant has not received the approval of his conduct
- 371 U.S. 296 (1962).
46

47

d.at 308.

1 d. at 309.
"'Aswas pointed out by the Court in Pan American "where the problem lies

within the preview of the Board, Congress must have intended to give it authority
that was ample to deal with the evil at hand." Id. at 312.
49
See note 4 supra.

1974]

CASE NOTES

by the CAB, the primary measure of conduct within the industry
will be the antitrust laws and not the Federal Aviation Act. An air
carrier in contemplation of future activities can not know whether
a prospective plaintiff will bring his action for damages only or for
injunctive relief. The carrier does know, however, that if the antitrust laws are to be applied in an action for damages only, the
sanction of treble damages is available. The carrier will not therefore risk conduct that conforms with the Federal Aviation Act
and the public interest, as defined therein, but that is violative of
antitrust standards.
Just as a proper application of uniformity invalidates the distinction between suits for damages only and those involving injunctive relief, it also requires the extention of the decision expressed
in Laveson to cases involving conduct that is no longer continuing
or affecting the plaintiff." While a judicial determination in these
cases would not involve a conflict between the injunctive powers
of the courts and the agency, it would impinge on the ability of
the agency to positively sanction conduct within the industry. Just
as a carrier can not know whether a prospective plaintiff will bring
his action for damages only or for injunctive relief, it can not know
when a plaintiff will bring his action. To allow the legal standard
applied to a defendant-air carrier's conduct to be determined by
the time the plaintiff's suit is brought is arbitrary and contrary to
congressional intent.
Whether the doctrine of primary jurisdiction will continue to
evolve in accordance with an expanded concept of uniformity is
not clear. The decision of the Third Circuit in Laveson has laid the
groundwork for a substantive determination that in all cases in
which the CAB has jurisdiction of the subject matter, a reviewing
court must defer to the Board." Unfortunately, decisions like that
expressed in Breen have placed the law in a condition of mixed authority."1 Because of the national character of the air transportation
50 See note 32 supra.
5
This determination is synonymous with the recognition of the Board's power
to immunize preapproval conduct.
"While Breen is supported by an earlier decision in the Second Circuit, Allied
Air Freight, Inc. v. Pan American World Airways, 393 F.2d 441 (2d Cir. 1968),
and several district level opinions, Aloha Airlines, Inc. v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc.,
349 F. Supp. 1064 (D. Hawaii 1972); Slick Airways, Inc. v. American Airlines,
107 F. Supp. 199 (D. N.J. 1951), the Ninth Circuit has recently followed the
Laveson decision in Price v. Trans World Airways, 481 F.2d 844 (9th Cir. 1973).
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industry, there is a chronic need for clarification by the Civil Aeronautics Board or the Supreme Court on the issue. If congressional
intent rather than independent judicial policy is to be given effect,
the reasoning in Laveson will be emphasized and extended. The
decision in Laveson proceeds from a sound construction of the
Federal Aviation Act, and weaves a web of consistency in application of competitive standards to the air transportation industry.
Robert C. Heidrick

WARSAW CONVENTIONSuPPLEMENTAL REGULATIONPromulgation of a Regulation Controlling the Form and Content
of the Notice of Limited Liability Provision on Passenger Tickets
by the Civil Aeronautics Board Neither Conflicts with Article 3
of the Warsaw Convention Nor Exceeds the Board's Statutory
Authority. Deutsche Lufthansa Aktiengesellschaft v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 479 F.2d 912 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
Lufthansa Airlines challenged a CAB economic regulation' that
required air carriers to include a notice containing specified language in a specialized size type on passenger tickets of the applicable
limitations on liability for loss of, damage to or delay in delivery of
baggage. This action was brought pursuant to the Warsaw Convention.2 Lufthansa, as a German citizen affected by the regulation,
contended that the requirement was contrary to the terms of the
'CAB Economic Regulations, 14 C.F.R. § 221.176(b) (1973) provides in
pertinent part:
(b) Effective March 1, 1972, each air carrier and foreign air carrier
which, to any extent, avails itself of limitations of liability for loss
of, damage to, or delay in delivery of baggage shall include on each
ticket . . . the following notice printed in at least 10-point type:
NOTICE OF BAGGAGE LIABILITY LIMITATIONS
Liability for loss, delay, or damage to baggage is limited as follows
unless a higher value is declared in advance and additional charges
are paid: (1) for most international travel (including domestic
portions of international journeys) to approximately $7.50 per
pound for checked baggage and $330 per passenger for unchecked
baggage.
2 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876 (1934) [hereinafter
cited as Warsaw Convention].
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Warsaw Convention and that the CAB did not have the statutory
authority to enact it. Subsequent to an adverse ruling by the Board,
direct review of the regulation's legality was afforded Lufthansa in
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia as provided by
the Federal Aviation Act of 1958.' Held, affirmed: The promulgation of a regulation controlling the form and content of a liability
limitation notice on passenger tickets neither conflicts with the
Warsaw Convention nor exceeds the Board's statutory authority.
Deutsche Lufthansa Aktiengesellschaft v. Civil Aeronautics Board,
479 F.2d 912 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
In reaching its decision the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia recognized the CAB's regulation as an attempt to provide United States travellers in international aviation with sufficient
notice that the carrier's liability is limited to a specific amount by
the Warsaw Convention. Lufthansa's challenge to the CAB's statutory authority to enact the regulation was dismissed by the court
of appeals. The court found that section 204(a)' of the Federal
Aviation Act of 1958, granting the CAB broad regulatory authority over civil aviation, and section 403(a)' of the Act, requiring the filing with the CAB of tariffs that contain all conditions of carriage, provided the CAB with ample authority to
regulate notice to the public of all those conditions of carriage of
'Federal

Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. § 1006(a) (1972) provides:
Any order.., issued by the Board ... under this Act ... shall be
subject to review by the courts of appeals of the United States or

the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
upon petition . . . by any person disclosing a substantial interest

in such order....
'Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. § 1342(a) (1972) provides:
The Board is empowered to perform such acts, to conduct such investigations, to issue and amend such orders, and to make and
amend such general or special rules, regulations, and procedure,

pursuant to and consistent with the provisions of this chapter, as
it shall deem necessary to carry out the provisions of, and to exercise and perform its powers and duties under, this chapter.
5
Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. § 1373(a) (1972) provides:
Every air carrier and every foreign air carrier shall file with the
Board, and print, and keep open to public inspection, tariffs showing
all rates, fares, and charges for air transportation . . . and showing
to the extent required by regulations of the Board, all classifications,
rules, regulations, practices, and services in connection with such

transportation. Tariffs shall be filed, posted, and published in such
form and manner, and shall contain such information, as the Board
shall by regulation prescribe. .

..
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which air carriers avail themselves.! The court of appeals also
rejected Lufthansa's contention that the requirements of the regula-

tion were contrary to the terms of the Warsaw Convention. Article
3 ( 1) (e) of Warsaw' requires that a statement concerning the Convention's liability rules appear on each passenger ticket. American
courts have consistently interpreted this provision as a notice requirement.' The court of appeals found precedent for the CAB
regulation in the supplemental regulations to article 3 of the Warsaw Convention which have been promulgated by the International Air Transport Association and approved by the CAB.' The
circuit court therefore concluded that the terms of article 3 are
not exclusive, but are subject to the Board's amplification." Accordingly, the CAB regulation was reasoned to give substantive
effect to the notice requirement of article 3 rather than to contradict the terms of that article.11 The court of appeals further noted

that if the carriers did comply with the regulation, there would be
no question of the sufficiency, adequacy or legibility of the notice,"
and the carriers would thus be able to invoke the limitations estab-

lished by Warsaw without fear of judicial contradiction.
Prior to the enactment of this regulation, article 3 (1) (e) had
6479 F.2d 912, 918 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
'Warsaw Convention, article 3(1) (e) provides:
For the transportation of passengers the carrier must deliver a passenger ticket which shall contain the following particulars:
A statement that the transportation is subject to the rules relating
to liability established by this convention.
'Compare the early case of Ross v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 190
Misc. 974, 77 N.Y.S.2d 257 (Sup. Ct. 1948), afl'd, 80 N.Y.S.2d 735 (App.Div.
1948), 85 N.E.2d 880 (Ct.App. 1949), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 947 (1955), with
the later cases of Warren v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 352 F.2d 494 (9th Cir. 1965);
Mertens v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 341 F.2d 851 (2d Cir. 1965); Boryk v. Aerolineas Argentinas, 332 F. Supp. 405 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Lisi v. Alitalia-Linee Aeree
Italiane, S.p.A., 253 F. Supp. 237 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), afl'd, 370 F.2d 508 (2d Cir.
1966), aff'd per curiam by an equally divided court, 390 U.S. 455 (1968), rehearing denied, 391 U.S. 929 (1968); Stolk v. Compagnie Nationale Air France,
58 Misc.2d 1008, 299 N.Y.S.2d 58, aff'd, 64 Misc.2d 859, 316 N.Y.S.2d 455
(App.T. 1970); Egan v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 21 N.Y.2d 160, 234 N.E.2d
199, 287 N.Y.S.2d 14 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1039 (1968).
'See, e.g., the following CAB orders which were IATA resolutions submitted
to the CAB for approval: CAB Order No. E-3230 (1949); CAB Order No.
E-11701 (1957); CAB Order No. E-20146 (1963); CAB Order No. 69-2-65
(1969).
10479 F.2d 912, 916 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
1
1 d. at 918.
1id.
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provided American courts with a useful avenue for circumventing
the Warsaw Convention's limits on liability." These monetary
limits have been the subject of criticism by many American writers
and courts who have described the limitations variously as inadequate, incredible, arbitrary, irresponsible, capricious, indefensible and unconstitutional." These critics frequently point out that
the Warsaw Convention was formulated in 1929 and that the protective function of the low limits on liability ceased to serve its
purpose when the aviation industry outgrew its infancy."5 The protection concept has been abandoned by the courts in the United
States in cases involving purely domestic aviation, a development
which paralleled the elimination in most states of limitations on
wrongful death recoveries."6 The resulting dramatic discrepancy
between recoveries for the death or injury of passengers on domestic flights and on international flights" provided the impetus for
American courts to seek to evade those articles of the Warsaw
Convention that limit recoveries. This evasion is most evident in
a line of cases that have circumvented the Warsaw limits through
strict interpretation of the notice requirement in both the delivery
1 See cases cited note 8 supra.
4

Welner, The Continuing Attacks by American Courts on the Warsaw Convention, 4 INT'L LAWYER 915, 920 (1970); J. KENNELLY, LITIGATION AND TRIAL
OF AIR CRASH CASES ch. 7 at 2 (1968). Mr. Kennelly discusses the issue he later
raised as plaintiff's attorney in Burdell v. Canadian Pacific Airlines, Ltd., 10 Av.
Cas. 5 18,151,
18,161 (Il1. Cir. Ct., Cook Ct. 1968): "It is almost inconceivable
that this treaty has been permitted to stand, without having been challenged concerning its constitutionality on the basis of the simple application of the due process clause of the United States Constitution." Burdell was later withdrawn and
revised to moot the issue of Warsaw's unconstitutionality, 11 Av. Cas. 5 17,351,
5 17,354 (11. Cir. Ct., Cook Ct. 1968), and then settled for $215,000. For discussions of the case see Mankiewicz, La Convention de Varsovie devant la Constitution des Etats-Unis d'Amerique, 23 REVUE FRANCAISE DE DROIT AlRIEN 256
(1969) and Comment, Warsaw Convention: Theme of Uncertainty, 35 J. AIR
L. & COM. 123, 131-33 (1969).
1
" See, e.g., Rhyne, International Law and Air Transportation, 47 MIcH. L.
REV. 41, 54-61 (1948); Lowenfeld and Mendelsohn, The United States and the
Warsaw Convention, 80 HARV. L. REV. 497, 504 (1967); S. SPEISER, RECOVERY
FOR WRONGFUL DEATH 493-94 (1966).
'See SPEISER, note 15 supra at 489-90. Judicial opposition to limits on recoveries is expressed in Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172
N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961).
"This disparity in recovery is discussed in 1 L. KREINDLER, AVIATION AcciDENT LAW 12B-8-12B-12 (rev. ed. 1971); see also recovery tables published in 33
J. AIR L. & COM. 591-93 (1967).
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of the passenger ticket and the legibility of the information contained thereon.18
The motive for this evasionary approach is commendable; it is
based on a genuine concern for international travellers whose recoveries in case of death or injury are severely restricted by the
Warsaw Convention, and who should be put on notice of the
limitations so they might be able to make an informed decision
on whether supplemental insurance should be purchased. The concept of adequate and sufficient notice of limited liability is a notion
basic to the United States system of fundamental fairness and
equity in the awarding of monetary damages. This judicial altruism
does, however, present serious problems because it promotes regulation of the international aviation industry by one country.
American courts have tried their hand in judicial treaty-making
and have, in fact, worked unilateral alterations in the Warsaw
Convention. The instant regulation takes that process one step
further. For the first time an agency of the United States Government has, on its own initiative, without benefit of international
approval, promulgated a regulation that alters an international

treaty.
The necessity of unifying international aviation law has long
been recognized and is evidenced by the passage of the Warsaw
Convention which clearly attempts to achieve this goal."' A fundamental principle of international aviation law is that each nation
has complete sovereignty over the airspace above its territory;"
this principle demands the existence of multilateral agreements
both in the use of international airspace and for the resolution of
claims arising in the course of international flights. International
air transportation raises questions of whose law should apply to
"See

cases cited note 8 supra.

"'For an idealistic view of the need for uniformity see W.

WAGNER, INTER-

NATIONAL AIR TRANSPORTATION AS AFFECTED BY STATE SOVEREIGNTY 175

(1970):

It is, of course, evident that aviation being the most international
of all means of transportation, it requires a complete standardization, a uniformity of national legislations under an international set
of rules to be applied to the air space. The air is an international

public domain; it has to serve all nations, be freely accessible to
them, and should be managed by the whole civil community.
"Convention on International Civil Aviation, signed at Chicago on December 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180 (1947). Article 1 of the Chicago Convention provides:
"The contracting states recognize that every state has complete and exclusive sov-

ereignty over the airspace above its territory."
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the citizens of which countries under what circumstances and which
tribunals should apply that law. The Warsaw Convention attempts
to resolve these questions in a uniform manner"' and additionally
to provide uniformity in the form and content of the various documents of international air carriage. Most importantly, Warsaw has
established a uniform rule of liability which imposes upon the carrier a presumption of liability for damages in case of an accident,
but limits that liability to a specific amount. 2 It was hoped that
this uniform rule would protect all international travellers from
widely varying rules relating to liability throughout the world. Although the arbitrary imposition of liability and its limitation are
departures from the ordinary rules of liability in the United States
and other countries, Warsaw's framers recognized the desirability
of providing for speed, sufficiency and certainty of recovery in
these multinational aviation situations."
Having adhered to the Warsaw Convention, the United States
formally espoused the Convention's goal of uniformity. Additionally, the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 establishes that the actions
of the CAB must be consistent with all treaties, conventions and
agreements to which the United States is a party.' The Lufthansa
decision poses serious questions in terms of international law and
foreign policy with regard to the sometimes conflicting roles of
the CAB, the International Air Transport Association and the
United States State Department.
The CAB, as an administrative agency, owes its existence to the
2' 1

cited

C. SHAWCROSS

& K. BEAUMONT,

AIR LAW 42-43 (3d ed. 1969) [hereinafter

as SHAWCROSS & BEAUMONT]:

The convention of Warsaw consists of a code which lays down certain conditions of contract for international carriage. It defines and
limits the rights of passengers and owners of cargo in such carriage,
and the corresponding liabilities of the carrier. It regulates the enforcement of those rights. It imposes upon the carrier a limited
liability in most cases of accident or delay...
22 Article 22 of the Warsaw Convention limits that liability to approximately
$8,300.
"See G. OR, THE PROPOSED WARSAW CONVENTION REVISION 7-10 (1953).
24 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. § 1502 (1972) provides:
In exercising and performing their powers and duties under this
chapter, the Board ... shall do so consistently with any obligation
assumed by the United States in any treaty, convention, or agreement that may be in force between the United States and any foreign country or foreign countries. ...
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Federal Aviation Act of 1958;' its powers, duties and the scope
of its authority are necessarily limited by that Act. Due to the Act's
inherent ambiguities, there has been variance in the interpretation
of many of its broadly-worded powers and duties. The CAB has
therefore been recognized as "a peculiar mixture of court, legislature, and political advisor."2 Although decisions of the Board
are normally reviewable by the courts," it is questionable how
objective a review of a CAB decision regarding the Warsaw Convention can be, realizing the judicial tendency to give great weight
to the decisions of the expert, specialized administrative agencies
and the judicial trend toward avoiding application of the limited
liability provisions of the Warsaw Convention. These two factors
lend strong judicial support to an extension of CAB authority.
The court of appeals in Lufthansa acted consistently with this
extension when it found authority of the CAB's promulgation of
the regulation in question by combining sections 204(a) and
403(a) of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958." The combination
and extension of these two sections, however, ignores two important
factors. First, section 403 (a) refers only to the tariffs that the carriers must file with the CAB. The court of appeals recognized that
the economic regulation in question deals with passenger tickets,
not tariffs, but indicated that the distinction was not a meaningful
one because the filing of tariffs and making them available to public
inspection would allow the CAB to control all notice to the public
of all conditions of carriage." This reasoning could enable the
CAB to impose considerable administrative and financial burdens
on air carriers by requiring the multivolume tariffs to be printed
for distribution to every air traveller. The second factor not considered by the court of appeals in Lufthansa is that the specific
notice requirement of the regulation relates only to the limitations
on liability for baggage. Limitations for baggage are commonplace
in domestic transportation in the United States, and if the limitations are properly filed by the carriers with the CAB, passengers
215Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. §S 1301-1542 (1972). The CAB
was originated in the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601, 52 Stat. 973 (1938).
20 Calkins, Appeals from Actions of the Civil Aeronautics Board (U.S.A.) Involving Foreign Air Carriers, 1966 YEARBOOK OF Am & SPACE LAW 32, 33.
27Id. at 33-55.
"See Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. §S 1324(a) & 1373(a) (1972).
29 479 F.2d at 919.
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are bound by them whether or not they have knowledge of the
conditions enumerated in the tariffs." Limits on liability relating
to baggage losses have not been subject to the same public policy
arguments that have arisen against limits for death or injury. The
new CAB regulation discussed in Lufthansa creates a nonuniform,
discriminatory system of baggage liability notification that places
an arbitrary burden on international transporters while doing
nothing to alleviate the same problem of notice to passengers on
domestic flights.
The CAB regulation at issue in Lufthansa also conflicts with the
policy of the United States toward the International Air Transport
Association. IATA is a voluntary trade association whose members consist of various airlines around the world. It was created to
deal with the problem of implementing the broad goal of uniformity in international aviation law pursuant to the Warsaw Convention. A forum was needed that would be more flexible and responsive to the rapidly-developing aviation industry than could
possibly be derived from the more cumbersome system of diplomatic conferences among governments. The organization thus allows "carriers themselves to perform the function [of an international CAB] while leaving to individual governments the opportunity of policing these agreements. . . ."" Resolutions passed by
IATA and agreed to among its member airlines do not immediately become effective; they must be given approval by the individual governments affected before they can be implemented."2
IATA has been concerned primarily with international rate
setting, but has also been responsible for establishing uniform
transportation documents including passenger tickets, baggage
checks and wayfare bills.' Although the format and content of
IATA tickets have been approved by the CAB, American courts
still have the option to disapprove the tickets if it is found that they
30See Herman v. Northwest Airlines, 222 F.2d 326 (2d Cir. 1955); Lichten
v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 189 F.2d 939 (2d Cir. 1951); Mao v. Eastern Airlines,
Inc., 310 F. Supp. 844 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
31Bebchick, The InternationalAir Transport Association and the Civil Aeronautics Board, 25 J. Ant L. & COM. 8 (1958).
1 For a detailed discussion of IATA see R. CHUANG, THE INTERNATIONAL
Am TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION (1972).
a"1 SHAWCROSS & BEAUMONT 345: "all IATA members are obliged to use a
standard form of air consignment note, passenger ticket and luggage ticket." Details of these documents are set out therein at 482-94.
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do not give adequate notice to passengers of liability limitations."
The CAB regulation in Lufthansa circumvents the IATA decision-making mechanism entirely, thus removing any sort of multilateral sanction to the CAB regulation. This action by the CAB
is not consistent with other events to which the United States was
a party. For instance, the United States established a precedent in
1966 for working through IATA in altering the notice provisions
of Warsaw's limitations on liability for death or injury to passengers by cooperating in the creation of the Montreal Agreement." The Montreal Agreement is the result of long and complex
negotiations among IATA members and their respective governments. The crucial issue confronting the negotiators was the limitation on liability for death or injury to international passengers, the
resolution of which through agreements among national governments had become impossible; the United States had threatened
to denounce the Warsaw Convention entirely because of the issue."
On the eve of the American denunciation's becoming effective,
IATA was able to provide a voluntary solution compatible with
the interests of all the parties, albeit temporary, until new international negotiations could take place. In addition to raising the
limitations on liability of international carriers having a stopping
place in the United States, the Montreal Agreement included a
provision requiring notice on passenger tickets that can be compared with the notice required pursuant to the CAB regulation at
issue in Lufthansa. The notice provisions of the Montreal Agreement deal only with the death or injury limitations; it is of note,
however, that the size type and the language requirements are
identical to those of the CAB regulation." Far from indicating any
"4See Mankiewicz, The Judicial Diversification of Uniform Private Law Conventions: The Warsaw Convention's Days in Court, 21 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 718,
731 n.42 (1972).
11CAB Agreement No. 18990, approved by CAB Order No. E-23680 (May
13, 1966) [hereinafter cited as Montreal Agreement].
" The threatened U.S. denunciation of Warsaw and the other events precipitating the Montreal Agreement are given extensive treatment in A. LOWENFELD, AIR LAW, ch. 6, 88-138 (1972).
The Montreal Agreement provides:
2. Each carrier shall, at the time of delivery of the ticket furnish to
each passenger . . . the following notice, which shall be printed in
type at least as large as 10 point modern type and in ink contrasting
with the stock on (i) each ticket ...

Advice to International Passenger on Limitation of Liability
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desire on the part of the international carriers to couch the notice

of limited liability in obscure, minute terms, the Montreal Agreement indicates a voluntary willingness on the part of the carriers

to impose on themselves the obligation to provide notice sufficient
to advise international passengers of the limitations. A serious
question is thus raised by the CAB's unilateral issuance of the instant regulation after the United States recognized and worked
through an established diplomatic channel, IATA, to obtain successfully the desired degree of notice to passengers only five years
earlier.
Another conflict is presented by the CAB regulation which
brings into question the role of the CAB in relation to that of the
United States State Department. The Montreal Agreement was an

effective means for reaching an immediate, but temporary result.
The airlines, realizing that a permanent modification of the terms
of the Warsaw Convention could only come to fruition through
diplomatic conferences and the amending procedure which the
Convention itself provides, 8 recognized the Agreement's temporary
nature. While the challenged CAB regulation was being promulgated, the State Department was deeply involved in the interna-

tional conference which the Montreal Agreement had anticipated.
The Guatemala Protocol was the result of that conference, and,

by its terms, the Warsaw Convention is modified specifically to
exclude any notice requirements to passengers at all.' The Protocol
Passengers on a journey involving an ultimate destination or a stop
in a country other than the country of origin are advised that the
provisions of ...

the Warsaw Convention may be applicable to the

entire journey, including any portion entirely within the country of
origin or destination. For such passengers on a journey to, from,
or with an agreed stopping place in the United States of America,
...the liability of certain . . . carriers ... for death of or personal
injury to passengers is limited in most cases to ... US $75,000. ...
For such passengers travelling . . . on a journey not to, from, or

having an agreed stopping place in the United States, liability . . .
is limited in most cases to approximately US $8,290 or US $16,580.
"Article 41 of the Warsaw Convention provides:
Any High Contracting Party shall be entitled not earlier than two
years after the coming into force of this convention to call for the
assembling of a new international conference in order to consider
any improvements which may be made in this convention....
A Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules
Relating to International Carriage by Air Signed at Warsaw on October 12, 1929,
as Amended by the Protocol Done at The Hague on September 28, 1955, ICAO
Doe. No. 8932 (1971). See 10 INT'L MATERIALS 613-16 (1971).
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has not yet been implemented in the United States, but the American delegates did sign it, and were in fact the leading figures in the
Protocol's formulation.' That two divisions of the United States
government could be simultaneously working on their own, inconsistent ideas of uniformity in international civil aviation seems incongruous and unnecessary.
The desirability of notifying passengers on international flights
that the liability of the airline for loss of, damage to or delay in
delivery of their baggage is limited cannot be denied, nor can the
couching of the terms of this notification in miniscule print be
endorsed. In order to obtain this goal, however, the CAB had
other means available to it that would be far more compatible with
the United States' position as a signatory nation to the Warsaw
Convention than was the promulgation of the instant regulation.
Included among these alternatives are amending the Warsaw Convention as provided in its text and working through IATA as was
done with the Montreal Agreement. The latter alternative would
provide for an internationally acceptable interim agreement until
the proper amendment to Warsaw could take place. Thus, more
uniformity of interpretation of the Warsaw Convention and of the
form of passenger tickets, as well as the certainty of all passengers
on international journeys receiving adequate notice, would have
been achieved. The CAB regulation challenged by Lufthansa represents an unwarranted effort on the part of the United States to
usurp control over international aviation.
The court of appeals in Lufthansa had only two alternativesto uphold the CAB's regulation or not. In choosing to uphold it,
the court has brought into question once again4 ' the good faith
"0See Fitzgerald, The Guatemala City Protocol to Amend the Warsaw Convention, 9 CAN. YEARBOOK INT'L L. 219 (1971) and Boyle, Kreindler & McPherson, The Guatemala Protocol: Three Views, 6 AKRON L. REV. 123 (1973).
"' American judicial manipulation of the Warsaw Convention has engendered
much criticism from foreign writers. See, e.g., Mankiewicz, lrregularit6 des documents de transports prescrits par la Convention de Varsovie, 8 DROIT EUROPgEN
DES TRANSPORTS 200 (1973); Mankiewicz, The Judicial Diversification of Uniform Private Law Conventions: The Warsaw Convention's Days in Court, 21
INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 718 (1972); Beaubois, The Air Carrier's Unlimited Liability
Under the Warsaw Convention and the Hague Protocol, ITA Study No. 1969/8-E
(1969); de la Pradelle, Varsovie de nouveau en question, 1966 REVUE Gk]N&,RALE DE L'AIR ET DE L'EsPACE 10; Le Goff, La jurisprudence des Etats-Unis sur
l'application de la Convention de Varsovie, 1956 R.G.A.E. 339 and 1957 R.G.A.E.
352.
Of the one hundred and five nations adhering to the Warsaw Convention, only
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and credibility of the United States as a party to the Warsaw Convention and, because it was expedient, has sacrificed the unification of international aviation law.
Paula M. Mastropieri

Canada has followed the United States' lead in circumventing the limitations imposed by the Convention. See Montreal Trust Co. v. Canadian Pacific Air Lines,
Ltd., 12 Av. Cas. 5 17,197 (Montreal Super. Ct. Dec. 31, 1971), and Ludecke
v. Canadian Pacific Air Lines Ltd., 12 Av. Cas. 5 17,191 (Montreal Super. Ct.,
December 7, 1971).
The dissent in the Lisi case, note 8 supra, summarized the problems posed by
the approach taken by the courts toward the Warsaw Convention at 370 F.2d
508, 515:
The majority here do not approve of the terms of the treaty and,
therefore, by judicial fiat they rewrite it. They think a "one-sided
advantage" is being taken of the passenger which must be offset by
a judicial requirement that a passenger have notice of the limitation
of liability . . . . The original limitations in the Convention may
well be outmoded by now. Substantial revisions upward have been
made, as they should be, by treaty and not by the courts. Judicial
predilection for their own views should not prevail over the limitations fixed by the legislative and executive branches of the Government...
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